In this paper, we propose a theory-based measure of alertness, the ability of a protest event to facilitate further contentious activity and attract higher numbers of protesters for further events. Our measure allows to pinpoint key features of contentious events and distinguish protest that leads to political instability. We use political protest in Ukraine as an empirical example to demonstrate our measure’s sensitivity to protest scale, activity and the nature of protesters’ demands
At first sight, political science seems to be on a good way in most countries. If this discipline, as a look at its beginnings in Athens may suggest, will flourish particularly well in times of political crises, then political science should be intellectually well fed in our period of regime collapse, geopolitical restructuration, and growing international tensions. At second sight, however, some disturbing features of «normal political science» become evident. They include the attractiveness of doing academic «routine science» instead of coping with actual practical problems; attempts at «pleasing the public» instead of taking a critical stance towards established political thought and behavior; comfortable limitation of research interests to contemporary issues instead of attempts at drawing lessons from the whole span of history; and practicing «occidental ethnocentrism» instead of striving at «analytic cosmopolitism». The article challenges these characteristics of today’s political science, thereby inviting a new generation of political scientists to new thematic and theoretical openness.
This article is focused upon the survival of democratic regimes and successfulness of democratization. The dynamical mathematical model is presented in the paper. The model’s departing point is the hypothesis of S.M. Lipset and A. Przeworski that the growth of the welfare leads to a mitigation of the interest groups` conflict over the redistribution of resources. This mitigation is met as a result of interrelated processes of broadening of a «compromise space», which is a range of mutually accepted policies, and of a convergence of different groups` preferences over the redistribution in an area of moderate policies.
The presented model illustrates how social capital (more precisely – its component responsible for trust between strangers) and institutional quality favor the stabilization of democratic regimes through the increase of economic productivity and welfare. According to the predictions of the model, total factor productivity (TFP) – understood as the opportunity of individuals and/or firms to cooperate efficiently – increases the overall wealth of the society given the same stock of human capital. It fosters the consolidation of democracy due to reduction of social tensions and improvement of functioning of democratic mechanism of economic policy elaboration. Following these results the hypothesis of positive impact of TFP on the survival of democracy is formulated.
The hypothesis was tested by means of survival analysis on the quantitative database on episodes of democratization («Regimes in the World»). The survival analysis showed that TFP is a significant and important predictor that lowers the risk of unsuccessful ending of the democratization episode (of the return back to more autocratic regime). The increase in TFP on 10 percentage points is ceteris paribus associated to the decrease of risk of leaving the track of democratization in 1.2-1.4 times. The obtained results are robust to the changes in the model specification or in a list of control variables.
Balanced growth paths are typical research subjects for models of macroeconomic dynamics. Balanced growth paths are model solutions that assume constant policy parameters (such as tax rate) and allow for monotonous and proportional growth of model components. In this paper, we construct and test a model with policy switching based on economic retrospective voting: the model allows to switch parties in office if an electorally important indicator exhibits decline. A change of ruling party brings about a change in policy. If the second party is then voted out of the office, the system experiences endogenous policy switching. Within this framework, we introduce the term "cyclically balanced growth paths", i.e. non-monotonous solutions where the proportionality of components is broken and then restored every political cycle. We conduct the analysis using differential equations theory and numerical experiments
The paper critically analyzes certain approaches in political science literature to understanding the efficiency. Moreover, there are certain problems of its operationalization and quantitative measurement. The authors question accuracy and “objectivity” of the existing concepts and methodologies used by empirical databases on an assessment of state efficiency. The research sets the purpose to reach the “more objective” efficiency which would respond the principles of valuable neutrality (absence of normativism), relevance and generality (suitable for any case regardless of a political regime, form of government, etc.), creating the conceptual frame and operationalization. Authors take an attempt to represent an approach to the “objective” efficiency as the ability of the state to transform its resources into socially significant results with minimal costs. This is supposed to be possible with Data Envelopment Analysis, which provides the production function of effectiveness by using input and output empirical data.
A model of information warfare in a society when one of the parties periodically destabilizes the system by a short-term jump-wise increase in the intensity of the propaganda in the media is analyzed. The model has the form of two nonlinear ordinary differential equations with a periodic discontinuous right-hand side. The asymptotical solution to the periodic solutions are constructed for the case of low-intensity dissemination of information through interpersonal communication. The transient regime is investigated numerically
This paper considers the problem of institutional development in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. We analyze existing approaches to explaining the causes and factors of institutional development and seek to determine why there was no evidence of institutional convergence in European countries between 1990 and 2014. We look at the theoretical and methodological limitations of approaches to the analysis of institutional development characteristic of mainstream political science. The data we utilize comprise a wide range of quantitative variables which measure levels of institutional development, social trust and political capital. We also use our own Total Factor Productivity (TFP) estimates obtained through non-parametric methods using raw data. We analyze relationships between the variables using correlations, regression analysis and clustering. The results of statistical analysis reveal the mechanism through which TFP influences institutional development: we show that TFP is a necessary prerequisite for institutional transformation.
The paper considers the problem of institutional development in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. We analyze existing approaches to explaining the factors and determinants of institutional development and strive to determine why there was no evidence of institutional convergence in European countries between 1990 and 2013. We look at theoretical and methodological limitations typical for mainstream approaches to the problem in contemporary political science. The data we utilize comprises a wide range of quantitative variables which measure levels of institutional development, social trust and political capital. We also use our own Total Factor Productivity (TFP) estimates obtained through non-parametric methods using raw data. We analyze relationships between the variables using correlations, regression analysis and clustering. The results of statystical analysis point at the mechanism through which TFP influences institutional development: we show that TFP is a necessary prerequisite for institutional transformation.
Partisan governments play an impor tant role in the elaborat ion of macroeconomic policies of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries: they manage ﬁscal policy and coordinate with a Central Bank that conducts monetary policy. Ideology is a crucial parameter of the ruling coalition. This study focuses on the inﬂuence of the ideology of the ruling coalition on macroeconomic policies of the OECD countries. Using statistical methods, the analysis examines the relationship between the “rightism” of the ruling coalition and such characteristics of budgetary policy as budget balancing, state expenditures and tax collection. The ﬁndings show that the inﬂuence of ideology is determined by a set of social and economic factors, so the nature of the inﬂuence that ideology wields may work in diﬀerent directions depending on the conditions.
In this paper employing both economics and political science we look into the problem of “development traps”, the mechanisms that block welfare growth in developing countries. By analyzing existing theories (“middle income trap”, “Malthusian trap” etc.) we suggest a systematic approach based on the notion of Total Factor Productivity (TFP). We use mathematical models and theoretical considerations to demonstrate how growth is being impeded through decreasing returns to economic production from a state’s increasing potential for violence. We use a panel sample to empirically test the hypothesis that development barriers, political institutions and economic productivity all influence each other.
In this paper, a mathematical model is developed for information warfare in society whereby an individual chooses between two suggested viewpoints. The model is based on the traditional Rashevsky framework of imitative behavior. A primary analysis of the model is conducted. The model has the form of a nonlinear integro-differential equation in which the unknown function is under the sign of the derivative and within the integration limit and acts as an argument of an exogenously given function.
The paper outlines a link between two theoretical perspectives on the prerequisites of high institutional quality and long run growth. One framework is based on the trade-off between disorder and dictatorship and introduces the notion of the institutional possibility frontier (IPF). The idea of IPF implies that social institutions can be situated on the continuum between two extrema of dictatorship and disorder; each point on the continuum has an associated level of social losses. It is implied that the dictatorship-disorder trade-off is more severe in some societies than in others. The other theoretical perspective focuses upon the role of total factor productivity (TFP) as a parameter underlying long run growth (TFP can be represented as a parameter A in the Cobb-Douglas function). It is possible to associate different social groups with different productivity factors in the Cobb-Douglas function and, further, with different institutional preferences on the dictatorship-disorder continuum. As a result, the linkage between TFP and IPF emerges and the effects of TFP can be interpreted in the framework of the IPF theory. The formalization of the linkage between two theoretical perspectives is presented in outline and it is shown that high TFP can mitigate the trade-off between dictatorship and disorder. The second part of the paper contains a tentative empirical analysis of the link between TFP and major institutional characteristics. It is demonstrated that this link is present and has from medium to high strength. An interesting innovation concerns the method of estimating TFP. By and large, the paper sheds some light on the nature of TFP and designates directions for further research on the fundamental conditions for high-quality development.
The article introduces the concept of the "democratization trap." Democratization can be considered as a process with an autonomous logic of development that cannot be fully g rasped by standard "actor-oriented" and "structural" approaches. The autonomous logic of democratization is formalized via a game-theoretical model with "politicians" and "voters" as players. They interact under conditions that are inherent to all young democracies. The model predicts that certain types of linkages between politicians and voters emerge endogenously; the emphasis is on the observation that these types of linkages are defective in the context of "liberal democracy." Moreover, these defective linkages may arise even if elections are free, honest and competitive. Empirical evidence underpins the main predictions of the model. The concept of the "democratization trap" may have several interesting implications which call for further research, from factors that cause democratic transitions to "freeze up" to contradictions between "liberal" and "democratic" components of liberal democracy.